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In this paper I examine the concept of disagreement in the political philosophies of Baruch 
Spinoza and contemporary French philosopher Jacques Rancière. Rancière understands 
disagreement to be an emancipating form of dissent and assertion of equality by an excluded 
part of society. Spinoza, by contrast, understands disagreement to be a divergence from 
rational agreement that arises from differences of experience and feeling: in particular, our 
differing feelings of inequality. I consider disagreement in the context of the UK referendum 
on membership of the EU, and the election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency (both 
2016). I suggest that the bad social feeling that followed these events reveals disagreement in 
Spinoza’s sense rather than Rancière’s: we should interpret them not as potentially 
progressive revolts of the excluded, but as the effects of divergent experience and feeling that 





A few weeks after the referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU,2 I overheard a 
colleague say ‘the working class shouldn’t be allowed to vote. They’re not intelligent 
enough.’ Though the comment was made in jest, the serious sentiment behind it was not 
uncommon. In the days and weeks following the referendum, educated people expressed the 
view that the referendum was won by people who are stupid and ill-informed, who don’t 
know what’s good for them, and who didn’t think through the implications of their vote. A 
more moderate variant, which quickly became the consensus view, presented the EU 
referendum result as the uprising of a group of people ‘long neglected’ and ‘excluded from 
politics’. A standard narrative emerged about these people’s feelings of being excluded from, 
and unbenefited by, globalization.3 The same responses dominated after Donald Trump won 
 
1 For their comments on earlier versions of this paper, I would like to thank Guy Longworth, Martin Saar, Jim 
Tomlinson, the attendees of the Aristotelian Society meeting of 14 November 2016, my colleagues at Aberdeen, 
and audiences in Kyoto, London, Leipzig, and Leuven. 
2 On 23 June 2016, UK voters were asked whether the UK should leave or remain in the European Union. 52% 
voted to leave. 
3 See, e.g., The Economist (2016). The data suggest that this is an over-simplification. 17.4 million people voted 
to leave the EU. The poorest voters (household income of less than £20,000 per year) were much likelier to vote 
Leave (Goodwin and Heath 2016), but the result could not have come about without a significant proportion of 
higher-income voters voting for it (Dorling 2016, Runciman 2016). More significant than income were 
educational experience and age, with the non-university-educated and over-55s likeliest to vote Leave (Goodwin 
and Heath 2016). Political engagement was less significant: those who said they pay a great deal of attention to 
politics were evenly divided between Leave and Remain, while those who said they pay little attention to 
politics were only 58% for Leave (Ashcroft 2016).  
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the US Presidency a few months later: the educated felt outraged at the capacity of the less-
educated to vote against the interests of their country and the world, and were told that this 
situation was explained by poorer people feeling ‘left behind’.4 A story has been concocted 
that blames the irrational poor and explains away their motivations, ignoring the sizeable 
proportions of middle- and higher-income voters whose support was crucial for both the 
Trump and Brexit victories. 
This characterization shows how little we have moved beyond the anxieties of early 
modern political discourse. That the rational governance to which the social contract gives 
way can be disrupted by the irrational feelings of ‘the people’ – leading to revolution and 
anarchy – is the worry that suffuses the political philosophy of Hobbes and Spinoza. This 
counter-rational force is seen as a potentiality by contemporary continental philosophers 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, for example) who uphold the capacity of ‘the people’ or ‘the 
multitude’ to effect meaningful political change. According to one such philosopher, Jacques 
Rancière, what is at stake both in the 17th century and today is a challenge to the political 
order of parts and wholes. A well-ordered community is a whole consisting of subordinate 
parts. The social contract expresses each part’s willingness to be a part, and to be a member 
of larger parts identified by function, wealth, age, and so on. But in the political moment, 
some part identifies itself with the whole: with ‘the people’ as such. This move disrupts the 
order of parts and wholes, bringing dissent to community consensus, with emancipatory 
potential.  
Rancière has a restrictive notion of politics: what we ordinarily think of as politics – 
‘the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing 
this distribution’ – he calls ‘the police’ (1999, p. 28). Policing, a term Rancière borrows from 
Foucault, is the practice of governing and maintaining the well-ordered community by 
keeping each ‘part’ in its assigned place in the whole.5 By contrast, politics exists only in 
moments of geometrical distortion, when a part of society identifies itself with the whole. 
This is not a matter of one part taking power from another, but of refusing to be a part, 
thereby exposing the flaws in the existing social order. He cites the example of Jeanne Deroin 
who, in attempting to vote in a French election in 1849, revealed the contradiction between 
the law of universal suffrage and the exclusion of women from voting. She asserted that 
women are not a ‘part’ of the people that can be excluded or included according to the rules 
of the current government, but that prior to any rules, women are the people. It is not a matter 
of demanding equal rights for the excluded part, but of asserting that the excluded part is not 
a ‘part’ at all. Rancière calls this assertion disagreement (la mésentente). This is not a dispute 
between rational positions or an objection to particular laws. It is declining to agree about 
what constitutes social order; dissent over the logic of parts and wholes that underlies the 
notion of political community. To be a part of a whole means that one can be counted or not 
counted, included or excluded, and identified with certain roles according to the social order 
(that is, the ‘police order’). Disagreement is a rejection of countable, identifiable parthood.  
Disagreement is a rejection of the political logic of parts and wholes that came to 
prominence in early modern philosophy. Spinoza, like Hobbes, understands the political 
community to be a whole made up of identifiable parts, and justice to be the proportionate 
 
4 Again, we should be sceptical of this view: 48-49% of those who earn more than $100,000 per year voted for 
Trump (a greater proportion than the 46% of all voters who voted for Trump); 41-42% of those who earn less 
than $50,000 did (Huang et al. 2016). 
5 I will use this term in Rancière’s sense throughout this paper. ‘The police’ and ‘police order’ do not refer to 
law enforcement officials or to militarization, but to the entire structure that determines and organizes people’s 
roles, powers, and capacities within society, with both positive and negative effects. For further elucidation of 
this term, see May (2008), pp. 41-3. 
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distribution of rights to those parts. For Rancière, this makes Spinoza continuous with a 
tradition that suppresses disagreement in the interests of the police order and consensus. 
Indeed, Spinoza’s concept of political community is based on the agreeing (convenire) of 
similar beings with similar levels of rationality. Yet like Rancière, Spinoza thinks disagreeing 
(discrepare) is an ineliminable element of politics that shapes our political actuality. For 
Spinoza as for Rancière, disagreement consists in a rejection of one’s parthood. But for 
Spinoza, this does not emancipate us from socially constrictive identities; rather, it locks us 
into them and isolates us from others. Disagreement is caused by differences in experience 
and feeling, differences that are exacerbated by inequality and that lead to political 
rejectionism and non-cooperation. 
In what follows, I will elaborate on Rancière’s sense of disagreement as emancipatory 
dissent from the political logic of parts and wholes, and Spinoza’s sense of disagreement as 
anti-social divergence over what is differently experienced and felt. Although these thinkers 
have different views about the value of disagreement to politics, they have similar ways of 
framing disagreement as originating in inequality, as involving the rejection of parthood, and 
as revealing itself in ‘bad social feeling’. I will suggest that the bad social feeling that 
followed the Brexit and Trump victories reveals disagreement in Spinoza’s sense rather than 
Rancière’s. That is, we should interpret these events not as potentially progressive revolts of 
the excluded, but as the effects of divergent experience and feeling that are likely to divide us 
and diminish our communities still further. 
 
II. Rancière: disagreement as dissent 
 
To understand what motivates Rancière’s belief in the emancipatory potential of 
disagreement, we need briefly to follow the historical narrative he offers for the concept’s 
emergence. Rancière is interested in the concepts and forces that have made political 
philosophy and contemporary politics what they are. He follows Michel Foucault in offering 
a genealogy of political thought, leading him to see the history of political philosophy, 
starting with Aristotle, as a suppression of politics.6  
Democracy, according to Aristotle, gives power to those who ‘though free, are not 
men of wealth and standing, [and] have no claim to goodness or excellence in anything’ 
(1962, III.11, cf. III.8).7 Rancière interprets this origin story of democratic freedom as 
follows. After debt slavery was abolished in Athens, freedom had to be attributed to a group 
of people of no account: debtors, that is, people without wealth or civic virtue who were 
without ‘value’. These people, who had no proper entitlement to freedom according to the 
prevailing law of the oligarchy – people who were not counted as part of the community – 
were henceforth free. This move forced a gap between wealth and domination. The wealthy, 
who previously ruled, were now the part of the community distinguished by their wealth, 
whereas the poor were the part distinguished by nothing but their freedom. This had two 
effects. First, the question arose of who legitimately governs – the question of Aristotle’s 
Politics. Second, the poor became a ‘part’ whose distinguishing feature, freedom, is actually 
universal to all people. This allowed the poor to reject their parthood and identify with the 
whole; to assert that they are the demos (Rancière 1999, p. 8). Thus the mere ‘people’, those 
of no account, became ‘the people’ in the sense of the community as such. A specific part, 
the part that has no legitimate part in the community, became identified with the whole 
community. The contentiousness of the excluded part claiming identification with the whole, 
is what politics is, for Rancière. Before this event, there is no politics, only domination and 
 
6 My account of Rancière is necessarily condensed. For a clear introduction to his political thought, see May 
(2008). 
7 References to Aristotle’s Politics are to book and chapter number. 
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revolt. After this event politics exists in those moments where a part of society – a part that is 
normally excluded from political community – rejects the parthood assigned to it by the 
police order and identifies with the whole. Jeanne Deroin, as mentioned earlier, rejected the 
notion that women are an includable or excludable part of the people and asserted that 
women are the people.8 Similarly Rosa Parks, in refusing to give up her bus seat to a white 
person, rejected the police order that made black people a part of the whole that could be 
included or excluded from it. 
Rancière believes that political community is wrongly understood as a whole of parts, 
precisely because this results in ‘a part that has no part’. He claims that ‘there is politics when 
there is a part of those who have no part’ (1999, p. 11). In other words, politics happens when 
those who are not counted interrupt the police order by rejecting their parthood and asserting 
their equality to the whole. Thus ‘political community’ always carries connotations both of 
inequality and of the potential for emancipation from it. Insofar as a community is political, it 
contains the inequalities and exclusions that give rise to disagreement; but in disagreement 
the original, anarchic equality of human beings is asserted. This is the equality of anyone to 
anyone else.  
Rancière’s ‘equality’ is not the ‘arithmetical equality’ of the marketplace (and of 
utilitarian ethics) which takes each person to be of equivalent value to, and exchangeable 
with, every other. Nor does Rancière uphold the ‘geometrical equality’ that grounds 
Aristotle’s view that each person is valued in proportion to his value for the community.9 
Both these definitions refer equality to the calculation of value, based on countable parts of a 
whole. For Rancière, countability is what underlies all police orders that deal in the inclusion 
and exclusion of parts. He wants to rehabilitate equality ‘that suspends simple arithmetic 
without setting up any kind of geometry. This equality is simply the equality of anyone at all 
with anyone else’ (1999, p. 15). 
At first glance this notion of equality looks simplistic. Indeed, it looks just like the 
arithmetical equality he claims to reject. Evidently drawing on Rousseau, Rancière 
understands equality to be embedded in human relationality rather than arithmetical 
equivalence. Specifically, equality is an aspect of our capacity to speak and understand: it is 
already present in the ‘power of reasoned speech’ through which Aristotle defines the 
political animal (1962, I.2). Our capacity to understand one another is presupposed in all 
human relations, including relations of dominance. For a master to subjugate a slave, the 
slave must be deemed capable of understanding the master’s commands. This confers on 
them a basic equality of understanding. Indeed, Aristotle’s definition of the ‘natural slave’ is 
one who ‘participates in the reasoning faculty so far as to understand but not so as to possess 
it’ (1962, I.5). Equality of understanding is therefore already presupposed in the domination 
of the Athenian slaves, and in all police orders: 
There is order in society because some people command and others obey, but 
in order to obey an order at least two things are required: you must understand 
the order and you must understand that you must obey it. And to do that, you 
must already be the equal of the person who is ordering you. It is this equality 
that gnaws away at any natural order. (Rancière 1999, p. 16) 
It is this equality that surfaces in the event of politics, the moment in which the ‘part that has 
no part’ asserts that it is the people. The poor or disenfranchised assert an equality that 
pertains to them as beings who speak and understand, but that has been denied them by the 
 
8 This does not mean that ‘the people’ consists (or should consist) exclusively of women. Nor does it mean that 
‘women should be recognized to be part of the people’, which asserts precisely the logic that the political event 
denies. ‘Women are the people’ indicates a rejection of parthood and of one’s identification with it, and an 
assertion that this group of people – any group of people – are simply the demos. 
9 ‘Justice is equality, but not for all persons, only for those that are equal’ (Aristotle 1962, III.9). 
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police order that assigns them to the part of society deemed unequal to political discourse. 
Equality is asserted ‘as a dispute over wrongful exclusion from the order of political speech’ 
(Corcoran, in Rancière 2015, p. 7).  
From that moment of Athenian democracy, anyone at all is entitled to speak, even 
someone with no qualification to do so. If anyone at all, even a freed slave, is equal to anyone 
else in speech and understanding, then every social order – every police order – is contingent. 
According to Rancière, Hobbes reveals the contingency of police order when he claims that 
the ‘natural’ relationship between human beings (in the state of nature) is a war of all against 
all, a state of equality in which anyone might dominate or kill anyone else (Hobbes 1971, pp. 
183-6). To gain security, that equality must be given up. Any police order could replace it, so 
long as it replaces natural equality with political inequality (the authority of some over 
others). The sovereign’s principal anxiety is that the natural equality of anyone with anyone 
else could reassert itself at any time. But the inequalities in any police order are possible only 
on the basis of this natural equality. ‘Politics occurs because, or when, the natural order of the 
shepherd kings, the warlords, or property owners is interrupted by a freedom that crops up 
and makes real the ultimate equality on which any social order rests’ (Rancière 1999, p. 16). 
This equality cannot be granted by governments or enshrined in constitutions, because it is 
already there, in the mutuality of understanding and speech, as the condition of possibility of 
any kind of governance. 
A political event, then, involves disagreement, and disagreement involves the 
assertion of natural equality. Politics happens rarely, for Rancière, because most of the time, 
the police order – whatever it happens to be – prevails. When politics does occur, it is 
unsettling, because disagreement is dissensus: the disruption of the consensus (agreement, 
contract) of the social order, and the disruption of the ‘community of sense experience’ 
(Rancière 1999, p. 58). In other words, a political event involves bad social feeling: it 
disrupts our feeling of community agreement and our ‘sense experience’ of what it is to 
identify with either a part of the community or its whole. The assertion of equality disrupts 
sameness, for it disrupts our sense that ‘we all feel the same way’. It disrupts identity, for 
disagreement involves dis-identification with one’s ‘part’ and its assigned properties. It is 
through these disruptions, breaks in group identities, and bad feeling that equality is asserted. 
‘The essence of equality is […] not so much to unify as to declassify’ (Rancière 1995, pp. 32-
3). Equality is the affirmation of a common capacity (for understanding) between beings who 
are different and who refuse to identify themselves or others through any signifiers of 
‘parthood’ (such as religion, race, or class). 
Were the votes for Brexit and Trump political events, in Rancière’s sense? Politicians 
on both the right and the left attributed the results to ‘neglected’ voters who had spoken as 
‘the people’. The mainstream media portrayed both outcomes as revolts by members of an 
excluded part against the political systems believed to cause their exclusion. Some writers 
explicitly claimed an opportunity for emancipation from the neoliberalist order (for example, 
Žižek 2016). If we understand the ‘excluded part’ here to be the economically disadvantaged, 
we must reject this characterization, since (as noted above) neither result was caused 
exclusively by this part. But arguably, the ‘excluded part’ could be more broadly defined to 
cover all those who felt politically marginalized; furthermore, disagreement is not the 
exclusive preserve of the oppressed. It may be expressed by anyone. Indeed, for members of 
politically ‘included’ parts to stand in solidarity with the ‘excluded’ could be a political act of 
dis-identification (May 2008, pp. 55-6). Either the Leave or Trump vote would be a political 
event in Rancière’s terms if – and only if – it involved voters dis-identifying with their ‘part’ 
and asserting equality.  
But neither event did that. In neither case did voters break with the identity of the part 
to assert ‘the equality of anyone with anyone else’. Quite the contrary: both events involved 
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an entrenchment of identities of nation, class, race, and educational background, with each 
part proclaiming its parthood and asserting its superiority to the others.10 ‘A dissensus […] 
consists in challenging the very logic of counting that marks out some bodies as political 
beings in possession of speech and consigns others to the mere emitting of noise’ (Corcoran, 
in Rancière 2005, p. 5); in both the EU referendum and the 2016 US election, each side saw 
the other as ‘emitters of noise’, and neither acted to assert equality of understanding. Political 
events reveal existing inequalities and enable people (even if only temporarily) to refuse the 
identities assigned to them by the police order. These events revealed existing inequalities – 
especially of education – to be decisive factors of classification but, rather than freeing 
anyone from the identity of their part, served to push each part further into itself and away 
from the other (see Runciman 2016).  
The EU referendum and the US election were posed and effected by the governing 
(‘police’) orders of each country, and further entrenched the divisions that characterize those 
orders. As Rancière has stated (2016), the vote for Brexit was an effect of policing: the 
exercises and exchanges of power that constitute the governance and management of people, 
that serve to solidify the part-whole logic, and that cause people further to identify with the 
‘part’ to which they have been consigned. The US election was no different. Thus, even if 
either vote involved an element of ‘revolt’ by an excluded part against the status quo, neither 
was a political event in Rancière’s terms. Both events reinforced, rather than challenged, the 
notion that people belong to parts of a whole, much less emancipated anyone from 
consignment to those parts. 
 
III. Spinoza: disagreement as divergence 
 
Spinoza would be equally inimical to interpreting the events of 2016 as emancipatory 
revolts. But on what grounds? It would be easy to use Spinoza to attribute the Brexit and 
Trump victories to the irrationality of ignorant voters. Spinoza’s view about the political 
potency of the masses is in line with others of the early modern era. Like Hobbes, he 
describes the masses as a threat to the stability and harmony of the state. This is largely due 
to their irrationality: people who have developed less reason have less understanding of what 
is good for them, and what they should do to realize that good. Their actions are determined 
by incomplete knowledge and feelings caused by experience. People who lack rationality do 
not act according to what is truly in their own interest and the interest of the community, but 
according to what they erroneously imagine will be good for themselves. Their desires and 
emotions lead to conflict, and their lack of autonomy means they are easily led by others.  
All this detracts from community stability, as Spinoza explains: 
Anyone with any experience of the capricious mind of the multitude almost 
despairs of it, as it is governed not by reason but by passion alone, it is 
precipitate in everything, and very easily corrupted by greed or good living. 
Each person thinks he alone knows everything and wants everything done his 
way and judges a thing fair or unfair, right or wrong, to the extent he believes 
it works for his own gain or loss. From pride they condemn their equals, and 
will not allow themselves to be ruled by them. Envious of a greater reputation 
 
10 In the UK this was evident in the view of some Leave voters that the British (specifically the English) should 
‘take back control’ of their country, and in the backlash against ‘experts’ (see Ashcroft 2016 and Runciman 
2016). Yet it was also present in Remain voters’ disdain for the supposed ignorance of Leave voters and the 
characterization of the poor as a misunderstood part of society incapable of speaking for itself (see Hanley 
2016). In the US election the entrenchment of identities on both sides has been blamed for Trump’s win (see 
Lilla 2016 and Freeman 2016).  
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or better fortune which are never equal for all, they wish ill towards other men 
and delight in that. 
There is no need to survey all of this here, as everyone knows what 
wrongdoing people are often moved to commit because they cannot stand their 
present situation and desire a major upheaval, how blind anger and resentment 
of their poverty prompt men to act, and how much these things occupy and 
agitate their minds. To anticipate all this and construct a state that affords no 
opportunity for trouble-making, to organize everything in such a way that each 
person, of whatever character, prefers public right to private advantage, this is 
the real task, the arduous work. [No one has ever] succeeded in devising a 
form of government that was not in greater danger from its own citizens than 
from foreign foes, and which was not more fearful of the former than of the 
latter. (Spinoza 2007, 17:4)11 
Spinoza here portrays the irrational mob as a danger to the state. Yet his understanding of the 
dynamics of reason and unreason in politics is far subtler than this characterization suggests. 
‘Rational’ and ‘irrational’ are not polar opposites: reasoning is one of two ways of thinking 
which everyone does to some extent.12 When we reason, we have adequate ideas of things, 
and deduce other adequate ideas from them. The other way of thinking, imagining, is based 
on experience and includes remembering, anticipating, and dreaming. From experience we 
have partial, confused, inadequate ideas. Since we are affected by the things we experience, 
imagining goes along with passively feeling the affects, also known as passions. We are made 
to feel the passions by our encounters with external things, and they cause us to react and 
behave in ways that stem only partially from our own nature. By contrast, reasoning and 
adequate ideas are tied to active feelings that follow from our own nature, and are therefore 
more autonomous. 
Spinoza stresses that everyone has some adequate ideas, and everyone has 
experiences and feels passions. Nobody is purely rational or purely imaginative. Our minds 
are a ratio of adequate to inadequate ideas which changes according to our circumstances. 
Good circumstances (such as education, a supportive family, and a peaceful community) give 
us opportunities to enhance our reasoning, whereas bad circumstances (such as poverty, debt, 
and violence) prevent our rational development and cause us to feel stronger passions. The 
poor and disadvantaged are likelier to be determined by their passions, and less likely to 
develop much reasoning. But there is no guarantee that the privileged will become highly or 
consistently rational. Reasoning requires effort and discipline, and powerful emotional events 
such as bereavement or illness can reduce our reasoning power. Our circumstances determine 
our rational development, and as our lives change, our power of reasoning changes too.  
 ‘The multitude’, therefore, is not simply an irrational mob. It is the people, each part 
of which is determined by different and changing proportions of imagining and reasoning. 
The problem is that developing strong reasoning is difficult and rare, so most people in a 
society are determined, most of the time, by their own particular experiences and passions. 
This leads them to disagree. Spinoza argues that ‘insofar as men are subject to passions, they 
cannot be said to agree in nature’, and ‘they can be contrary to one another’ (1994, IVP32, 
P34).13 He claims that we ‘agree in nature’ only insofar as we reason (1994, IVP35). So we 
will find agreement where there are high levels of reasoning, and disagreement where there 
are low levels of reasoning and the passions are at their strongest.  
 
11 References to Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise are to chapter and paragraph number. 
12 Spinoza’s third kind of thinking, intuition, is not important to our discussion here. 
13 References to Spinoza’s Ethics are to Part number (Roman numerals) and the number of the Proposition (P; 
Arabic numerals), followed in some cases by Corollary (C) or Scholium (S) number. 
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 To understand the political significance of agreement and disagreement, we need to 
look at Spinoza’s metaphysical account of these terms. Spinoza believes people have a 
common human nature or essence.14 He also believes that every individual strives to 
persevere in being what it is, and to increase its power to do so (1994, IIIP7). To strive in this 
way is to ‘seek one’s advantage’. Human individuals are instantiations of human essence, 
which determines them to strive for the continued existence and increased power of human 
nature in themselves. In striving for goods that are determined by human nature, we strive for 
goods that are common to all human beings and we ‘agree in nature’ (Spinoza 1994, IVP31-
37). Thus someone who is determined by his essence to seek his advantage also acts in the 
interests of others, and agrees with them in nature. Only reasoning enables us to understand 
and act according to what is essentially advantageous to us.  
It follows that insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they 
must do only those things which are good for human nature, and hence, for 
each man, that is, those things which agree with the nature of each man. 
Hence, insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they must 
always agree among themselves. (Spinoza 1994, IVP35) 
Things that agree with our nature – that is, highly rational human beings – are good for us, so 
the more rational people are, the better and more useful they are for one another (Spinoza 
1994, IVP31, P37). Politically, ‘agreement’ means convergence on common goods and 
mutual aid towards achieving them, which leads to a stable, strong, and harmonious society. 
Disagreement comes about when we seek our advantage from what we imagine and 
feel will lead to our betterment, rather than from what we rationally know will be good for 
our nature. Our striving for our essential advantage is derailed by what our different 
backgrounds and circumstances determine us to desire and do. This derailment is more 
powerful and long-lasting the less reason we have developed. Our thinking and acting are 
determined more by what we experience, and what we feel and imagine will lead to our 
betterment. Our different circumstances cause us to differ in our affective responses, and thus 
in our judgments about what is good and bad for us: 
Different men can be affected differently by one and the same object, and one 
and the same man can be affected differently at different times by one and the 
same object. […] Because each one judges from his own affect what is good 
and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, it follows that men can vary 
as much in judgment as in affect. (Spinoza 1994, IIIP51)  
To the extent that our experiences and feelings motivate our thinking and acting, what we 
strive for differs substantially. Through the different conditions of our lives and our different 
experiences, we can be contrary to each other and disagree in nature. Note that Spinoza 
distinguishes contrariety from difference (1994, IVP31C). Things are ‘contrary to us’ insofar 
as they are ‘evil for us’: that is, insofar as they diminish our power of acting (Spinoza 1994, 
IVP30). People who are ‘torn by passions’ can be contrary to each other and disagree in 
nature (Spinoza 1994, IVP33-4). Yet people can differ in ways that do not diminish one 
another’s power: differences of belief, for example, need not cause strife as long as everyone 
agrees to obey the law (Spinoza 2007, ch. 20). 
Politically, disagreement is destabilizing because we do not converge on common 
goods or help each other to achieve them. Instead, each individual strives in a different 
direction for what appears to be good for her, frequently leading her to conflict with the 
striving of others. We strive for apparent goods which seem to reflect our own experiences 
and satisfy our own feelings. Disagreement can cause us to desire the same scarce resource, 
resent those who appear to stand in our way and envy those who appear more successful. 
 
14 As I explain in Lord (2014) pp. 62-3, I take this claim to be supported by Spinoza (1994) IP8S2 and IP17S. 
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Disagreement can also cause destructive joyful passions. The more we reflect on our 
differences from others – the more we consider our circumstances and striving to be 
distinctive – the more likely we are to affirm and love our own distinctiveness, with 
deleterious results: 
Joy arising from considering ourselves is called self-love or self-esteem. And 
since this is renewed as often as a man considers his virtues, or his power of 
acting, it also happens that everyone is anxious to tell his own deeds, and show 
off his powers […] and that men, for this reason, are troublesome to one 
another.  
From this it follows that men are by nature envious, or are glad of their 
equals’ weakness and saddened by their equals’ virtue. For whenever anyone 
imagines his own actions, he is affected with joy, and with a greater joy, […] 
the more he can distinguish them from others, and consider them as singular 
things. So everyone will have the greatest gladness from considering himself, 
when he considers something in himself which he denies concerning others. 
(Spinoza 1994, IIIP55S) 
Disagreement can cause us to rejoice in what we perceive to be our unique characteristics and 
actions. This makes us feel other powerful passions, pull further apart from others, and reject 
or ignore our commonalities with them. Disagreement is ‘irrational’ in that it arises from 
diminished reasoning and leads us to strive for what is not truly in our interest. Yet this is our 
primary mode of being. Most of us, most of the time, do not act in our own interest, although 
that is exactly what we imagine and joyfully affirm ourselves to be doing. 
Spinoza thinks that when we agree in nature, we cohere as parts of a whole human 
community. In his account of the origins of the state, Spinoza indicates that in the state of 
nature each person is a sovereign whole, seeking only his own advantage, from a very low 
point of rationality (2007, ch. 16; 1994, IVP37S2). Everyone agrees to become a part of a 
larger whole through the social contract, and agrees to seek the advantage of the whole, either 
through rationally knowing that it is good, or through obedience to laws that encourage 
community-oriented action. Whenever we disagree in nature, we revert to thinking of 
ourselves as sovereign wholes. This is underwritten by Spinoza’s metaphysics: everything is 
both a whole and a part of various greater wholes, rising in compositional complexity to the 
whole of nature. As he explains in a letter to Oldenburg, a thing is considered a ‘part of a 
whole’ insofar as it adapts its nature to those of other parts and they are in ‘the closest 
possible agreement’; it is considered a whole to the extent that it resists adaptation to other 
things, and ‘insofar as they are different from one another’ (1994, pp. 82-4). What holds of 
physical bodies also holds of individuals. Insofar as we agree, we consider ourselves parts of 
a community whole; insofar as we disagree, we reject our political parthood and consider 
ourselves wholes in our own right. 
Disagreement threatens the social order, for Spinoza as for Rancière. It causes bad 
social feeling. Unlike Rancière, Spinoza does not see any potential for emancipation in 
disagreement, but sees it as the source of a destabilizing narcissism. This is particularly 
apparent when we examine the passions of pride (Superbia) and despondency (Abjectio). 
Spinoza describes these as affects of comparison. They arise when people are driven to 
compare their achievements with those of others, to obsess over their uniqueness or 
inadequacy, and to feel themselves to be superior or inferior. In other words, pride and 
despondency are how we feel our inequality to others. Pride is ‘thinking more highly of 
oneself than is just, out of love of oneself’, and despondency is ‘a sadness born of a man’s 
false opinion that he is below others’ (Spinoza 1994, III Definitions of the Affects XXVIII, 
and IVP57S). Both feelings tend to perpetuate themselves. The proud person seeks those who 
flatter her, loves herself all the more, and feels joy in this self-love. She is highly prone to 
10 
 
envy, but rejoices in feeling that she is above others. The despondent person ‘is very near the 
proud one’ in that he too is prone to envy, and seeks to exult over those even more 
despondent than himself, leading him, perversely, to feel good about his own despondency 
(Spinoza 1994, IVP57S). Out of all the passions, Spinoza singles out pride and despondency 
as indicating ‘very great ignorance of oneself’ and ‘very great weakness of mind’ (1994, 
IVP55-6), for the proud and despondent have no rational understanding of their true value to 
others, that is, their value as human beings who can agree in nature. They evaluate 
themselves in terms of their difference from others and take pleasure in their disagreement. 
Whereas Rancière sees disagreement as the assertion of one’s equality, Spinoza sees 
that it can involve the perverse affirmation of one’s inequality. To disagree from pride or 
despondency is to assert the uniqueness of one’s experience, affects, and actions, and to feel 
one’s superiority or inferiority to be good and worthy of respect. These passions are likeliest 
to arise in societies that are highly unequal and that place value on individual achievement. 
Differences in power and material goods will cause pride and despondency to be keenly felt, 
while individualism leads people to imagine themselves as sovereign wholes with sole 
responsibility for their achievements or failures. This does not encourage us to agree in 
nature, but instead to seek to identify with others according to those non-essential 
characteristics we take to distinguish us. We seek to identify with those who feel similarly 
proud or despondent about their economic circumstances, their power or oppression, their 
educational achievement, religion, or nationality. We seek to associate with those who share 
our passions, who ‘love what we love, and hate what we hate’ (Spinoza 1994, IIIP31C). 
Contra Rancière, who takes disagreement to involve dis-identification with affective groups, 
Spinoza understands disagreement to cause us to identify through our affects and to feel these 
affects all the more strongly. Such groupings have nothing to do with our common essence, 
and do nothing to encourage the agreement in nature that leads to political harmony. Feeling 
unequal to others can lead to identity-based factions that make our societies unstable. 
For Spinoza, disagreement derails us from pursuing what is truly in our interest. 
Worse, it leads us to take pleasure in diverging from the common human good. Bad social 
feeling leads to bad social effects. It leads to entrenched groups that identify on the basis not 
of reason, but of shared passions and feelings. Those who are subject to strong passions of 
pride and despondency, and who associate with others who feel the same, are likely to reject 
what is in their rational interest, and to take pleasure in doing so.  
After the Brexit vote, commentators noted that in parts of England that had benefitted 
from EU funds, citizens voted strongly ‘against their own interests’ to leave the EU. Similar 
comments were made about working-class American Trump voters. From Spinoza’s 
perspective, it is not clear whether the rational interest of human nature is better served by 
staying in or leaving the EU, or by voting Republican or Democrat in the 2016 US election. 
The point is that for those on both sides who are subject to strong passions, their rational 
interest is entirely obscure: they act against it not because they know what it is and choose 
otherwise, but because their actions tend towards what they feel and imagine to be best. This 
can lead them to reject what is presented to them as being ‘in their rational self-interest’ by 
those with whom they do not affectively identify, and to take pleasure in this rejection.15 
People who feel strong passions are determined by forces external to them. I suggest 
that we should understand those forces in terms of inequality and how it makes us feel. One of 
the most striking correlations with voting patterns in both cases was voters’ feelings about 
their lives today, in comparison to the past. 58% of Leave voters think life in Britain today is 
worse than 30 years ago; 78% of Trump voters believe their family financial situation is 
worse today than in the past. 61% of Leave voters and 63% of Trump voters think life will be 
 
15 For some contemporary reflections on this phenomenon, see Mishra (2016) and Hanley (2016). 
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worse for the next generation. By contrast, just over 50% of Remain voters, and 59% of 
Clinton voters, think life will be better for the next generation, and 73% of Remain voters 
think life in Britain is better today than in the past (Ashcroft 2016; Huang et al. 2016). These 
attitudes reflect the feeling of one’s own flourishing in comparison to how one imagines other 
human flourishing: whether one’s own flourishing in the past, others’ better (or worse) 
flourishing in the present, or one’s children’s flourishing in the future. In short, these attitudes 
reflect the comparative affects of pride and despondency. These feelings are not restricted to 
the poor and uneducated, but are felt by voters across all income groups.16 Spinoza’s point is 
that the more strongly these affects are felt, the more strongly people will be determined to 
reject their parthood. As pride and despondency become greater, the greater is our ‘weakness 
of mind’, and the greater is our disagreement as we lose sight of any basis for adapting to 
others as parts of a broader whole. 
These effects occur particularly strongly where inequality is rife and individualism is 
valued. So it is not surprising that in two socially and economically unequal countries in 
which the ideology of individualism is held to be part of the national identity,17 people voted 
on the basis of experience and feelings, and that people identified more with their own 
affectively similar groups than they did with the whole. The strong support for socially 
divisive measures against immigration, women’s and minority rights, and greater 
environmental and human wellbeing is indicative of disagreement: voters rejected their 
parthood of a larger whole, and instead affirmed the sovereign wholeness of themselves and 
the group with which they share the same experiences and feelings. This reflects how the 
feeling of inequality can perversely lead to the affirmation of inequality, and therefore its 
persistence. Those who won were determined by the experience and feeling that their lives 
were getting worse. This despondency quickly turned into the exultation of victory, but on 
Spinoza’s prediction, deeper despondency, and more non-cooperation, will be the 
outcomes.18  
We in the UK and the US have experienced a great deal of bad social feeling in 2016. 
There is no sign that this feeling will disappear. Rancière and Spinoza give us different ways 
of understanding this feeling as a sign of disagreement. And both Rancière and Spinoza give 
us worthwhile insights into the political force of disagreement. Rancière shows us that 
consensus politics always involves inequality and exclusion, and is shot through with 
misunderstanding: there will always be breaks and disruptions that generate bad feeling, that 
reject the logic of consensus, and that cannot be neatly resolved in it. Rancière’s view is that 
democracy develops and changes through these breaks, in which our equality is momentarily 
made present. Spinoza shows us that inequality has other, emotional effects. It causes 
passions which lead people to break with the whole, to regard themselves as sovereign 
individuals, to fail to cooperate, and, perversely, to ‘fight for their servitude as if they were 
fighting for their own deliverance’ (Spinoza 2007, Preface:7). Both thinkers show that 
disagreement is an unavoidable political force that disrupts the rationality of the social order. 
About the value and outcome of that disruption, they disagree. 
  
 
16 For example, Frank (2016) attributes the Trump victory partly to the pride of Clinton supporters. 
17 The US and the UK have high levels of income inequality in comparison to other rich countries (Atkinson 
2015, pp. 21-3). By ‘the ideology of individualism’ I mean the broad set of views, from Locke onwards, that 
takes the autonomous human individual to be the primary agent of change and locus of responsibility. 
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